The Vietnam And Somalia Syndrome History Essay

The Vietnam And Somalia Syndrome History EssayDefining add-on discussion has become fraught with ambiguities since it has near recently been a veneer in disturbances in Iraq and Afghanistan ex post facto. As Reiff asserts struggles waged by developed countries all aspire on a authorized level to human-centered intervention1The use of humanitarianism justification as veil for national interests has clouded the terminology and sustained perceptions that humanitarianism is a fomite of Imperialism.2In order to frame the analysis, Holzgreffe qualifies humanitarian intervention as The threat or use of force across render borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens.3Although humanitarian intervention is r atomic number 18ly purely altruistic, the inclination to address violations of human rights beyond national interests should be the driving force.4T his analysis aims to explore the extent to which Vietnam and Somalia, two foreign policy interventions widely perceived as failures, yield become synthesized into humanitarian intervention policy-making. As Robert Jervis argues, No intervention is discreet and separate each instance changes the governmental landscape in which the actors operate.5 accordingly the analysis will explore how these historic analogies interacted and claimed policy-making consciousness. By evaluating the extent to which policy makers viewed humanitarian crises through the historical lens, it will examine how all(prenominal) decision is partly a response to past outcome.6The analysis will retrace political implications of Vietnam in the Carter and Reagan era, leading to examine if George H.W Bushs assertion that the Gulf War successfully kicked the Vietnam syndrome held truth. Furthermore, it will argue that failures in Somalia can be linked to Vietnam syndrome thus shaping foreign policy in Rwanda. It will argue that historical legacy of Vietnam and Somalia had three key repercussions for US humanitarian interventions it questioned the global US habit, it altered scheme by insisting on clear preys and end goals and heightened the drive for garnering public consensus. However, that historical factors cannot be viewed in isolation, a confluence of formation level factors in the post-cold war period and individual factors also moulded episodes of humanitarian engagement. owe to the limited scope of the essay, the analysis will focus upon key case studies up until the Clinton era, although this is by no means an exhaustive list of humanitarian interventions.The look-alike Vietnam has functioned as a metaphor for humiliation, exposing the limits of American power and capability on the international scene. Vietnam syndrome extended from a term to describe post traumatic vehemence existd by veterans to encompass the political impact of the conflict on home soil, engendering a be lief that the United States should avoid military intervention afield7. Amid the rising causalities, the loss of public consensus raised questions about the US case in conflicts with limited national interest.8However, the way in which lessons from Vietnam were synthesized into foreign policy alter and often coalesced into different strategies. In his Notre Dame Speech Carter recognised the moral void left by Vietnam calling it the best example of mental and moral poverty.9Across the left, Vietnam syndrome generally manifested itself in an disgust to military engagement fear in which the US would become bogged down in a interchangeable quagmire. As a result, the Democratic majority in Congress enacted the 1973 War Powers Resolution, restricting the president from sending U.S. host into combat for more than ninety age without congressional consent.10By reasserting congressional authority over foreign policy making, it aimed to avoid centralization of decisions in the hands of a presidency to prevent other Vietnam scenario.11Conversely, the failure of Vietnam was perceived largely across the right as self-inflicted owing to the absence of weapons-grade leadership and substantial force thus contributing to the post-war dec get out. Reagans revisionist rendition of Vietnam attributed self-doubt to the failure in Vietnam There is a lesson for all of us in Vietnam. If we are forced to fight, we must have the means and determination to prevail.12 thusly he aimed to restore the US role to its pre-war status quo and dispel the image of US decline on the public stage.Congressional refusal to authorise military intervention in Central America despite Reagans attempt to link humanitarian and national security interests, showed that Vietnam syndrome had trumped the Reagan Doctrine. The proxy war bolstering anti-communist allies and the reluctance to commit boots on the ground demonstrated that Vietnam had left a profound imprint on US strategy. In view of a pote ntial Vietnam re-run in Central America, the Weinberger dogma codified collective lessons from the Vietnam. It consisted of six tests to be used before the United States intervened including that vital interests must be at stake and congressional and public animation must be obtained.13The clearest enunciation of military policy since Vietnam reflected how Vietnam syndrome had become integrated in US strategy, later informing the Powell doctrine.14Reagans successor George H. W Bush, was acutely apprised of the constraints Vietnam syndrome placed on foreign policy as referenced in his inauguration speech The final lesson of Vietnam is that no great nation can hold to be to be surrendered by memory.15Bush asserted that Vietnam was a case in point of how not to use military force, voicing particular lit crit of Johnsons gradual escalation of firepower in Vietnam.16Bushs chance to exorcise Vietnam Syndrome came when ibn Talal Hussein Husseins military repression of Kurdish and Shii te uprisings prompted a mass exodus of refugees into Turkey and Iran. This was compounded by the closure of Turkeys borders, forcing thousands of Kurds to be trapped in the hostile mountain pass. Following international pressure, the US retracted its initial policy of non-intervention, founded on the fear it would make the U.S responsible for the politics that emerged in Iraq.17Resolution 688 authorized military force to guarantee humanitarian organisations access to civilians in Iraq and was launched by declaring a no-fly zone and relief operation for the Kurds.18The intervention synthesized the lessons from Vietnam in two key ways. Firstly, the need to garner public support was met by Bush emphasising moral grounds, which were ambiguously delineated in Vietnam. Bush equated Saddam to Hitler revisited creating a good vs. evil frame through which public opinion could perceive the conflict.19He contended that I think the humanitarian concern the refugee concern is so overwhelming th at there will be a lot of understanding about this.20The moral impetus of the US role as an upholder of humanitarian values, coupled with the United Nations Security Councils resolution appended legitimacy to intervention serving to reinforce public support.Secondly, Vietnam syndrome had clear repercussions in Bushs strategy. The conditions for the use of force, stipulated in the Weinberg doctrine were adequate institutionalized with the Powell doctrine.21From an individual level of analysis Colin Powells beliefs sets were shaped by experiences as a Vietnam veteran , I was appalledfighting the war in Vietnam without ever pressing the political leaders to lay out clear objectives for them.22The Powell doctrine called for overwhelming force, once diplomatic means are exhausted, and a clearly defined exit strategy. The doctrines tenets are reflected in Operation stomach Comfort given the USs reluctance to persuade Turkey to meet its international humanitarian obligations and open its borders, grounded in the fear of beingness sucked into a civil war.23Bushs advisers warned that broadening a U.S. rush to finding a solution to Kurdish identity could become a protracted business, ceding to bang creep analogous with Vietnam.After the success of the Gulf war, Bush proclaimed By God, weve kicked the Vietnam Syndrome once and for all demonstrating the degree to which Vietnam had shaped foreign policy. Operation Provide Comfort had no doubt raised the nations confidence in its foreign policy and military leadership.24However Bushs eulogy of the syndrome was premature the conduct of humanitarian intervention, emphasising air-power and avoiding mission creep complied with the Vietnam syndromes central canons of using maximum force with minimal casualties which effectively institutionalized the syndrome rather than kicking it.25Equally, the military success is more likely to have triumphed the Powell doctrine rather than exorcising Vietnam Syndrome and concerns with in tervention abroad.26Informed by the lessons of Vietnam, the Powell Doctrine reinforced heavy reliance on fire-power, technology and a concrete exit strategy which blinded US policy makers to the complexity of the political terrain in Somalia.27Clinton inherited the Somalia intervention from the Bushs administrations involvement in UNISOM I which monitored the ceasefire in Mogadishu and escorted deliveries of humanitarian supplies. do a clear distinction between his democratic engagement policy, Clinton stressed that intervention in Somalia was purely humanitarian The U.S. military mission is not cedely nor was it ever one of nation building.28However, the initial success was curtailed by the black-hawk down incident culminating in images of a dead US soldier dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, rekindling the latent casualty aversion left by the Vietnam vestige. This was exacerbated by the belief that Somalia was a low-risk humanitarian intervention and by the CNN effect of real-time news reports eliciting a strong emotional response amongst public opinion.29Amid rapidly deteriorating public and congressional support for the mission, Clinton announced the end of U.S. involvement in Somalia.The Somalia syndrome is inherently linked to Vietnam Syndrome as alluded to in diplomat Richard Holbrookes coining of Vietmalia syndrome30. The Powell Doctrine, stemming from the lessons of Vietnam, locked the US into a realist mindset that overwhelming force would reap success in combat operations, shifting the focus away from non-state actors.31Equally, limited objectives attach by the avoidance of mission creep prevented the mission expanding into a tougher approach to peace-keeping. These factors were incoherent with the deeply rooted political factors of the humanitarian crisis. Bushs assertion that Our mission was humanitarian we do not plan to dictate political outcomes32became untenable given that political reconstruction became intrinsic to humanitarian in terests this is evidenced when the purely humanitarian objective spiralled into pursuing a Somalia warlord.In their man-milieu hypothesis, Sprout and Sprout argue the context in which decision makers operate is formed by a variety of factors including history, destination and political institutions.33Clintons lack of military experience attracting criticisms of incompetence, his personal anti-Vietnam stance34and the republican majority in congress all interacted to shape the Somalia strategy.35The reluctance to commit troops to Somalia highlighted not only how the spectre of Vietnam permeated the policy remit but also that the historical analogy coalesced with individual and domestic factors. This supports the initial argument that Vietnam syndrome was present amongst a confluence of other factors influencing foreign policy.In the first framework of US peace-keeping role in the post- Cold War period, PDD 25 formally enshrined The Somalia Syndrome in US policy. It depict specific c riteria for US peacekeeping efforts and stipulated the US unwillingness to become involved in sub-national conflicts.36This precluded refusal to respond to the Rwandan genocide and supported the view that Somalia was a pivotal factor in influencing US policy making process.37The Somalia syndrome manifested itself in two key ways in US policy regarding Rwanda. Firstly, the public and political sphere viewed the unfolding violence misguidedly through the Somalia lens. As Klinghoffer sustains The Somalia image of a failed state with random violence masked the actual premeditation and directing role of the Hutu extremists in the interim government.38This demonstrates that the historical proximity of the Rwandan genocide to Somalia became an analogical referent through which the events were seen in the frame work of a common African schema. That is to say, characteristics of the Rwandan genocide such as a failed-state and mass violence etc. were seen as synonymous with Somalia. Des Forg es argues the hopeless imagery created by Somalia, legitimized the policy inaction.39In this line of thought, congressional and public opinion perceived a repeat of the Somalia imbroglio as unacceptable to future peacekeeping operations. Secondly, Washington became wary of peacekeeping missions undertaken by other countries fearing a costly U.S entanglement and crossing the Moghadishu line from peacekeeping to combat operations.40This underscored a retreat from assertive multilateralism to a limited US role in peacekeeping g operations.Non-intervention in Rwanda demonstrates that the Somalia syndrome had profound effects firstly in terms of defining the US role. As the sole superpower in the post-war era with leverage over United Nations, the unwillingness to demonstrate moral leadership in Rwanda restricted the parameters of US exceptionalism. Furthermore, policy makers responded to public casualty aversion in Somalia which consequently limited strategy options in Rwanda where nati onal interests were not articulated.41Vietnam and Somalia have become increasingly institutionalized ranging from the War powers act to PDD 25.42As outlined in the introduction, this has set a paradigm of redefining the US role in humanitarian interventions. By narrowing criteria for intervention, the Somalia Syndrome undermined the USs special role in New world Order envisioned by Bush.43Furthermore, the strategies which have evolved from lessons of Vietnam and Somalia have not be homogenous Reagans proxy wars, the Powell doctrine and non-intervention in Rwanda demonstrate how the historical milieu has interacted with system and individual level factors thus generating key differences between Vietnam and Somalia syndromes. Following Vietnam, the US wanted to avoid the Soviet Union capitalising on US entanglement in a Third World conflict. Conversely, as the worlds sole superpower in the post Cold-war era, in the aftermath of Somalia Washington downplayed the threat posed by flunk states with no national interests. This is supported by the man milieu theory which shows that Individual factors such Clintons lack of experience in foreign policy and Powells Vietnam experience have interacted with the lessons of Vietnam to formulate humanitarian intervention policy.Finally, public support became intrinsic to granting the moral legitimacy lacking from Vietnam. The polarization of public and congressional opinion laboured future presidential policy options and exemplified the need to link national interests with humanitarian crises. A significant drop in American tolerance for battlefield causalities no longer justifiable in the post Cold-War era by the struggle against communism, forced Clinton to retreat from an earlier multilateral humanitarian agenda.44Historical analogies continue to inform foreign policy. Parallels between Vietnam and Afghanistan in terms of protracted insurgency, public hostility and scepticism of a moral justification raise questions about the legacy of Afghanistan Syndrome on future humanitarian crises.